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1231 
URGE TO REFORM LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SO 
NONVIOLENT 





As the world shifts towards an abolition of capital punishment, 
the United States remains the only western democratic state to employ 
the death penalty during times of international peace.1  Thirty states 
currently sentence defendants to death, and states which have 
abolished the policy utilize some form of life without the possibility of 
parole.2  This successor form of punishment was virtually nonexistent 
until the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision, Furman v. Georgia,3 which 
temporarily abolished the death penalty.  Since the reinstitution of the 
death penalty, life without parole sentences have punished far more 
people than first intended.4  The long-term implications of this 
sentence are only recently coming to light.5  In particular, the effects 
of this mode of punishment on juveniles and the mentally ill raise large 
 
*Juris Doctor Candidate 2019, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Criminal Law 
Concentration. Aspiring federal prosecutor seeking to shift America’s criminal justice system 
to align with successful rehabilitative models seen in other countries. Thank you, Professor 
Rena Seplowitz, for igniting the fire within me to publish my ideas; thank you to Steven Fink 
and the Touro Law Review staff. 
1 Kristi T. Prinzo, The United States—”Capital” of the World: An Analysis of Why the 
United States Practices Capital Punishment While the International Trend is Towards Its 
Abolition, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 855, 856 (1999). 
2 State by State, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2019), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty. 
3 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 420 (1972). 
4 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT 
OFFENSES 11 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013). Statistics will 
be discussed later in this section. 
5 Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implication for Post-Prison 
Adjustment (2001), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/75001/Haney.pdf. 
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concerns.6  However, the effects on individuals addicted to drugs and 
alcohol are absent from the discussion. 
The Eighth Amendment shelters defendants from cruel and 
unusual punishments.7  Past debates surrounding which forms of 
punishment constitute “cruel and unusual” have focused around the 
death penalty.8  This Note will argue that life without parole for addict 
prisoners is equally “cruel and unusual” and that rehabilitative 
alternatives should be administered.   
This Note will be divided into five sections.  Section II will 
discuss the American history that led nearly all states to embrace life 
without parole and other pro-incarceration techniques as an alternative 
to the death penalty.  This section will reflect on the Supreme Court 
cases that have guided state action in this area as well.  Section III will 
provide arguments against life without parole for addicts.  This section 
will be divided into three subsections.  Subsection A will demonstrate 
how the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution should be interpreted 
to include a life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) sentence 
for an addict as a “cruel and unusual” form of punishment.  Subsection 
B will address how an addicted brain is less culpable of criminal 
conduct than a healthy brain.  Subsection C will disprove the common 
arguments supporting incarcerating addicts for life.  Section IV will 
propose changes that should occur within our judicial system to ensure 
that sick, addicted, and diseased persons will receive the treatment they 
require instead of an extended death sentence.  This section will also 
call on prosecutors—whose power to shape the system is arguably as 
great as lawmakers themselves—to act to eliminate these sentences. 
Finally, Section V will recommend the implementation of three steps 
to ensure that change will occur.. 
 
II. HISTORY 
State statutes LWOP practices date back as early as 1841.9  The 
most significant increase in life sentences of this nature began in the 
 
6 Id. at IIIA.  
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
8 Judith Lichtenberg, Against Life Without Parole, 11 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 39, 40 (2018). 
9 Year That States Adopted Life Without Parole (LWOP) Sentencing, DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CENTER (2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-states-adopted-life-without-
parole-lwop-sentencing. 
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss4/7
2020 URGE TO REFORM LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 1233 
mid-1970s and grew through the 1990s after lawmakers responded to 
an increase in drug abuse and related crime with the War on Drugs.10  
President Nixon and his administration sparked the beginning of a 
multi-decade long effort to combat drug abuse as “public enemy 
number one.”11  The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 created a 
single all-inclusive statutory scheme criminalizing the possession, 
distribution, and manufacture of all drugs for recreational use.12  
Nixon’s policy reforms did more than criminalize drugs; the national 
undertaking allocated $105 million of the appropriated $155 million to 
treatment and rehabilitation efforts.13  Unfortunately, by the 1980s, 
during Ronald Reagan’s presidency, Congress slashed the funding for 
these treatment programs to less than one-fourth of those original 
reserves.14  In 1984, Congress introduced new mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug offenses, and just four years later, expanded these 
laws to include attempts and conspiracies.15  These decisions would 
have profound long-term effects on the federal prison population by 
putting those involved at even the lowest level (lookout, couriers, street 
dealers) at risk of lifelong federal imprisonment.16  Although 
government efforts to label drugs as public enemy number one fell to 
the background of the political sphere through the 1990s and 2000s, 
the anti-drug movement already tainted the beliefs of many Americans. 
Currently, nearly all states, including New York, Florida, 
California, and Texas,implement some form of this lifelong 
punishment.17  Each of these jurisdictions sentences individuals to life 
with parole, life without parole, and “virtual life” sentences.18  
However, sentences including LWOP have been administered 
 
10 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT 
OFFENSES 33 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013). 
11 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT 
OFFENSES 1329 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013). 
12 Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L. J. 1323, 1330 (2016). 
13 Kreit, supra note 12, at 1329. 
14 Id. at 1332. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 ASHLEY NELLIS, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND LONG-TERM 
SENTENCES 10 (The Sentencing Project, 2017). 
18 Id.  Virtual life (or de facto life sentences) are sentences not statutorily defined as a “life 
sentence,” yet the term of imprisonment is so long that the prisoner is unlikely to survive if 
carried out in full.  Researchers estimate a sentence of 50 or more years falls under this third, 
virtual life category.  It is difficult to define virtual life sentences because a prisoner’s age at 
the time of imprisonment is a key factor in the calculation. 
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disproportionately across the country.19  As of 2016, 53,290 inmates 
were serving LWOP sentences, which equates to one out of every 
twenty-eight inmates.20  However, just over half of this group consists 
of inmates from a handful of states, including Florida, Pennsylvania, 
California, and Louisiana, as well as the federal system.21  Of the 
prisoners serving LWOP for nonviolent offenses nationwide, 79%, 
approximately 2,577 inmates, are incarcerated for drug offenses.22  
That number for federal inmates is 1,989, or 96% of prisoners with 
LWOP sentences.23 
The term “nonviolent” is somewhat misleading due to its 
varying interpretation among the states.24  While the expression 
“violent” is often interpreted by the public as synonymous with murder 
or rape, some jurisdictions include the following in this category: 
manufacture or sale of a controlled substance, extortion, burglary, and 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.25  Thus, many drug-
addicted prisoners may, in fact, be labeled as violent for crimes 
committed in furtherance of their habits.   
Shifting this country’s “tough on crime” mindset to one of 
understanding and rehabilitation would ameliorate the drug problem 
and produce benefits for addicts and society.  It is not “tough” to 
imprison diseased people who need help, especially those who have 
aged past their years of a proclivity for lawbreaking.  Quite to the 
contrary, it wastes vital taxpayer resources that could be utilized for 
crime prevention and rehabilitative measures.  For our nation to 
progress, we must first look back in time at how our justice system has 
dealt with issues regarding lifelong punishments. 
Rather than apply an evenhanded system of review for 
noncapital offenses, the Supreme Court has deferred to Congress’s and 
state legislatures’ decisions regarding LWOP sentencing.26  The first 
major example of this laissez-faire approach can be seen in Rummel v. 
 
19 Nellis, supra note 17 at 10. 
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit Crime?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/20/too-old-to-commit-crime#.jVkAeF0cA 
(Mar. 20, 2015). 
23 Id. 
24 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT 
OFFENSES 18 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013). 
25 Id. 
26 Turner, supra note 24 at 207. 
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Estelle.27  In this 1980 case, the Supreme Court upheld the mandatory 
life sentence of a nonviolent Texan man.28  The three felonies leading 
to his statutorily required sentence included: fraudulent use of a credit 
card to obtain $80, forging a check for $28.36, and obtaining $120.75 
by false pretenses.29  Under his sentence, Rummel would be eligible 
for parole after 10 to 12 years.30 
The defense argued that Rummel’s life sentence was grossly 
disproportionate to his nonviolent offenses, thus violating the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments.31  In a 5-4 
decision, the Court held that the Texas recidivist law did not violate 
the Eighth Amendment because states have a significant interest in 
sentencing repeat criminals incapable of conforming to societal norms 
more harshly.32  The Court bluntly noted that outside the context of 
capital punishment, challenges to the proportionality of sentences are 
rarely successful.33  Albeit, just three years later, a new case discounted 
this statement when the Court confronted the issue of lifetime 
imprisonment without any possibility of parole.34 
In 1983, the Supreme Court made a decision that revealed the 
panel’s distaste for life sentences without the possibility of parole for 
nonviolent crimes.35  Thirty-six-year-old Jerry Helm was convicted in 
a South Dakota state court for writing a “no account” check for one 
hundred dollars.36  The usual punishment for such a crime under state 
law was five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.37  However, 
because the defendant had six prior nonviolent felony convictions, 
South Dakota’s recidivist statute required an LWOP sentence.38  
Helm’s prior crimes included: three, third-degree burglaries, obtaining 
money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and driving while 
intoxicated.39  The Court acknowledged that Helm never committed a 
 
27 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980).  The Supreme Court’s language shows 
much deference to the state – “Texas is entitled to make its own judgment.”  
28 Id. 
29 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 263-66 (1980). 
30 Id. at 265. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 271. 
34 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
35 Id. 
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single crime against another human being.40  Notably, the Court also 
recognized Helm’s addiction to alcohol as a contributing factor in each 
case.41  This key factor of addiction was not present in Rummel. 
The Court came to its decision by noting that nonviolent crimes 
are less serious than violent crimes against persons and that sentences 
may be unconstitutional on excessive length alone.42  The majority 
applied a three-prong proportionality analysis of the Eighth 
Amendment to reach its decision, considering: 
(1) The gravity of the offense and the harshness of the 
penalty. (2) The sentences imposed on other criminals 
in the same jurisdiction. (Whether more serious crimes 
are subject to the same penalty or to less serious 
penalties. (3) The sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions.43 
The decision stated that the death penalty is different from 
other punishments, not in degree but in kind.44  What the Court meant 
is that those sentenced to LWOP suffer the same degree of damage as 
death row inmates, even though the “kind” of punishment differs.45  
The Supreme Court held that Helm’s sentence violated the Eighth 
Amendment as disproportionate to his crime.46  Incarcerating a man of 
his nature for life without the possibility of parole is unlikely to 
advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial 
way.47  Neither the addicted defendant nor the State will have the 
incentive to rehabilitate this individual as he so desperately needed. 
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court spoke again on the issue 
of lifelong imprisonment, this time dealing with California’s hotly 
contested “3 Strikes” rule.48  Plainly stated, the state enacted this 
extreme legislation in 1994 to ensure longer prison sentences and 
greater punishment for prior felons.49  The law applies to any defendant 
 
40 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 n.22 (1983). 
41 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 n.22 (1983). 
42 Id. at 278. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 294. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 303. 
47 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 n.22 (1983). 
48 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
49 Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 395,  403-15 (1997). 
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convicted of three serious felonies.50  Under the statute, the felonies 
are not required to be committed consecutively or within a certain time 
period, and the time between offenses does not affect the imposition of 
the sentence.51  On the third felony, or “strike,” the law withdraws the 
court’s discretion to commit the defendant to a diversion program or 
rehabilitation center.52  Conversely, the individual is often placed 
behind bars permanently, without any possibility of parole.53  The 
statute provides that the defendant’s minimum sentence will be the 
greater of three times the term of imprisonment for each current felony, 
twenty-five years, or a term determined by application of the 
California penal code plus other enhancement provisions.54  The reality 
behind this language is that the best outcome a three-strikes defendant 
can hope for is twenty years in prison.55  The law’s promises to reduce 
crime and diminish the financial burden on society have been called 
into question by critics.56 
The Supreme Court acknowledged this debate nine years after 
the harsh law took effect in the case of Ewing v. California.57  Yet, the 
holding of the case was not a win for opponents of the legislation.  
Ewing was convicted of a felony grand theft for stealing three golf 
clubs, each worth $399.58  Pursuant to California law, the court 
sentenced Ewing to a mandated life sentence.59  The state had 
previously convicted Ewing of four serious or violent felonies, 
including three separate burglaries, only one of which was an armed 
offense.60  The Court held that California’s Three Strikes Law does not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.61  Therefore, Ewing’s sentence 
 
50 Id. at 403. In 2012, Proposition 36 would alter what “kinds” of felonies could be 
considered. This will be discussed at length in section IV(b). 
51 Id. at 404. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 401. 
54 Id. at 407. 
55 Vitiello, supra note 49 at 407. 
56 Id. at 422-37. Vitiello shows how the analysis used to estimate savings to society is 
flawed; Ewing 538 U.S. at 27. 
57 Supra note 48. 
58 Id. at 13. 
59 Id. at 18-20. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 29. 
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of twenty-five years to life in prison was not grossly disproportionate 
to his combined felonies of grand theft and three separate burglaries.62 
The dissent compared Ewing’s case to Rummel and Solem to 
consider how the Court reached differing outcomes in each 
circumstance.63  Ewing’s claim fell somewhere between the Rummel 
and Solem logic.64  Ewing’s claim was stronger than the claim 
presented in Rummel, where the court upheld a recidivist’s 25 years to 
life sentence as constitutional.65  Yet, it was weaker than the claim in 
Solem, where the Court struck down a recidivist sentence as 
unconstitutional.66  The reasons relate to the the differing outcomes of 
each conviction.  By looking at the three pertinent comparative factors 
in each case, it becomes clear why the seemingly similar cases were 
handled differently.  The first factor, prior record or offender 
characteristics, remained somewhat equal among all three cases.  
Ewing’s prior record was not much different from Helm’s or 
Rummel’s; four prior felonies as compared to Helm’s six and 
Rummel’s three.  The second factor, offense conduct, was also fairly 
similar because both offenses included a low monetary loss.  However, 
the last factor, length of likely prison term, varied.  While the defendant 
in Rummel had the possibility of parole ten to twelve years after his 
sentence began, Helm did not have this benefit and faced a lifetime 
behind bars.  Ewing’s prison term was more than twice as long as the 
term at issue in Rummel.  The Court admitted that Ewing, seriously ill 
when sentenced at 38, would likely die in prison.  Ewing was classified 
as a property offender in the case and not a drug user, even though 
Ewing’s former charges included possessing drug paraphernalia.67 
In each case, the defendant’s mental health status was nearly 
absent from the discussion.  There was no discussion of LWOP 
sentencing practices’ effects on adult drug addicts.  However, success 
in the movement to eliminate LWOP has been found for juveniles.68  
In Graham v. Florida, the Court openly noted that a life sentence alters 
the offender’s life irrevocably by depriving the defendant of the most 
 
62 Id. 
63 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. at 34. 
64 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 36. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 18. 
68 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 
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basic liberties without hope of restoration.69  In this case, the Florida 
court sentenced seventeen-year-old Graham to life behind bars.70  A 
year prior to his sentence, Graham was charged with two serious 
felonies: armed burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed 
robbery.71  After taking a plea deal and serving twelve months in 
county jail, Graham was released on parole, only to be again arrested 
for armed home robbery six months later.72  The trial court held a 
sentencing hearing at which it found that Graham was guilty of the 
charges and no longer capable of rehabilitation.73  Thus, Graham was 
given the maximum sentence authorized: life imprisonment without 
the possibility of release.74 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed this decision on the 
ground that the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel 
and unusual punishments.  Although the justices briefly mentioned 
Graham’s upbringing by two crack-addicted parents, his alcohol 
consumption, and tobacco use by age nine and marijuana use by age 
thirteen, the Court did not rely on these factors as much as Graham’s 
youth at the time of sentencing.75  Ultimately, the Court scrutinized the 
categorical practice of lifelong sentences for juveniles.  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Kennedy stated that LWOP, “gives no chance for 
fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with 
society, no hope.”76  The Justice highlighted that the United States is 
the only nation that imposes LWOP sentences on juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders.77   
If the Court was willing to compare punishment strategies to 
the rest of the world in reviewing our treatment of juveniles in the 
justice system, it would help us understand the morality of LWOP 
sentences on addicted persons.  Similarly, our country needs to 
consider the implications that these living death sentences have on 
 
69 Id. at 70. 
70 Id. at 52-53. 
71 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 54 (2010). It is important to note here that Florida law 
gave the District Attorney’s office the discretion whether to charge sixteen and seventeen-
year-olds as adults or minors for most felonies.  Graham’s prosecutor chose to charge Graham 
as an adult. 
72 Id. 
73 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. at 58. 
74 Id. 
75 Graham, 560 U.S. at 53. 
76 Id. at 79. 
77 Id. at 81. 
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addicts and their families.  If the Supreme Court scrutinizes the 
categorical practice of lifelong sentences for addicts in the same way 
it has scrutinized this sentence for youthful offenders, it could 
eliminate this elongated death sentence for addicts in need of 
rehabilitation. 
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST LWOP 
Many who argue against the death penalty cite LWOP as the 
answer to our nation’s recidivism concerns.78  While some accept this 
blanket solution, the realities behind this punishment are far from 
positive.79  : Both the Constitution and scientific evidence support the 
idea that a punishment of life behind bars for those with substance 
abuse issues is immoral and unjust. 
A. LIFE SENTENCES FOR ADDICT PRISONERS 
VIOLATES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT 
In determining whether any form of punishment is 
constitutional, we look to the language and interpretations of the 
Eighth Amendment.  Before Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court 
adamantly followed the notion that “death is different” from any other 
type of sentence,80 finding the acceptable outer constitutional limits of 
capital punishment stemmed from the evolving standards of decency 
test.81  Conversely, determining acceptable punishment in non-capital 
cases was determined by a vague and narrow proportionality 
principle.82  Here, courts were to consider all circumstances of the case 
 
78 19 UPAJLSC 185, 186, Into the Abyss: The Unintended Consequences of Death Penalty 
Abolition. 
79 19 UPAJLSC 185, 186, LWOP inmates “are not afforded the same heightened due 
process protections afforded to those on death row by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of 
death…. They have less access to the courts and less ability to challenge the accuracy or 
legality of their convictions and are therefore in a worse position than those who have been 
sentenced to death.”   
80 William W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death, 71 OH. S. L. 
J. 1109, 1111 (2010). 
81 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972). The evolving standards of decency test 
must “mark the progress of a maturing society.” 
82 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 86 (2010); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
10
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in deciding whether the sentence was unconstitutionally excessive.83  
Due to a lack of a clear or consistent interpretation of this standard 
(besides clearly grossly disproportionate sentences), courts obtained 
little guidance in determining whether a life sentence without parole 
fit a particular crime.84  However, in  Graham, the Court strayed from 
the “death is different” ideology and applied the same level of scrutiny 
to LWOP as in capital cases.85  In doing so, the Court blurred the line 
between capital and non-capital cases for the first time, suggesting that 
a new category had evolved somewhere in the middle.86  LWOP 
sentences now require the higher level scrutiny standard, which is 
measured by the evolving standards of decency test.87  
Before the Graham decision, the Court implied this standard in 
Solem v. Helm to find that a life sentence for a nonviolent crime 
violated the Eighth Amendment.88  However, this case acted as an 
exception rather than the standard.89  Looking even further back in 
time, we can catch a glimpse of how the Court viewed the Eighth 
Amendment as applied to drug addicts. 
 In 1962, the Supreme Court held that it is cruel and unusual to 
impose even one day of imprisonment for the status of drug 
addiction.90  In Robinson v. California, a California statute made it a 
crime for a person to be addicted to the use of narcotics.91  The state 
convicted Robinson based solely on the fact that scarring on his arms 
evidenced a past of needle-injecting drug use.92  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that to imprison a person merely for his 
status, even though he never touched a narcotic drug nor found guilty 
of any irregular behavior in the state, is unconstitutional.93  In essence, 
treating drug addicts like criminals is cruel and unusual punishment 
 
83 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. at 58. 
84 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72-73 (2003); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-97. 
85 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S at 61-62. 
86  Supra note 80. 
87 Id. at 1123. 
88 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
89 Supra note 80 at 1119. As previously mentioned, Solem established a three factor 
proportionality analysis: The gravity of the offense versus the harshness of the penalty, 
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties, and 
how other jurisdictions penalize the crime. 
90 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
91 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660. 
92 Id. at 687 and n.4 (White, J., dissenting). 
93 Supra note 90. 
11
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under the Eighth Amendment.94  This is because narcotics addiction 
can be contracted innocently or involuntarily.95 
However, by 1990, the Court, in Harmelin v. Michigan, ruled 
that a life sentence for a single possession of cocaine was not cruel and 
unusual punishment.96  The defendant in Harmelin was convicted of 
possessing 672 grams of cocaine and sentenced to a mandatory term 
of life in prison without possibility of parole.97  Defense counsel 
argued that the defendant’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment 
because of its significant disproportionality to the crime.98  Further, the 
defendant's lack of any prior felonies was irrelevant under Michigan 
law, which mandated his life sentence.99   
The Court rejected the defendant’s constitutional claim and 
went on to answer the question of whether the Eighth Amendment 
contains a sentence proportionality guarantee.100  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia stated that the framers intended the Eighth 
Amendment as a check on the ability of the legislature to authorize 
particular modes of punishment, rather than as a guarantee against 
disproportionate sentences.101  Thus, the Eighth Amendment does not 
contain a proportionality guarantee that the Court found during the 
Solem case just seven years ago.102  The Court reasoned that in Solem, 
the majority misinterpreted the framers' intent.103  While a 
disproportionate punishment can always be deemed cruel, it will not 
always be unusual.104  In ruling that cruel and unusual does not include 
a proportionality principle, the Court rejected the three-factor analysis 
 
94 Id. at 668-76 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Justice noted that England treats addicts as 
sick people and not criminals as the United States does.  He commented that although this fact 
alone does not make California’s penal law unconstitutional, we must acknowledge the group 
of drug addicts who have “lost their power of self-control.”  He stated that “cruel and unusual 
punishment results not from confinement, but from convicting the addict of a crime.” 
95 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
96 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 958 (1991). 
97 Id. at 961. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 994. 
100 Id. at 965. 
101 Id. at 960. 
102 Id. at 965. 
103 Id. at 966. 
104 Id. at 967. 
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from Solem.105  Although the Court upheld the Michigan statute, it 
surmised that reasonable minds may differ about its effectiveness.106 
The dissent adamantly stated that there can be no doubt that 
prior decisions of the Court had construed cruel and unusual to include 
a proportionality principle.107  The dissent also cited Robinson, noting 
that the ripple effect on society caused by drugs (crimes stemming 
from drug deals, health problems, lost productivity) is not the direct 
consequence of possession, but of the resulting addiction.108   
The Court did not, however, recognize that drug addictions are 
perpetuated by the justice system’s recycling of addicts rather than 
properly rehabilitating them.109  Criminalizing individuals who possess 
drugs for personal use is the same as criminalizing a status.  Similarly, 
it is cruel and unusual to put diseased people who need rehabilitation 
behind bars for life.  These propositions become clear by taking a 
closer look at the criminal culpability of an addicted individual. 
B. AN ADDICT BRAIN IS LESS CULPABLE 
The first concept taught in many criminal law classes is that a 
crime requires both a voluntary act, or actus reus, and a culpable 
mental state, or mens rea.110  When a defendant is found guilty of a 
crime, the verdict essentially means that the defendant intended the 
result to occur.  The justice system asks whether the crime was 
committed by the individual, not whether the crime was committed in 
furtherance of an addiction.  While a defense of voluntary alcohol or 
 
105  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991). 
106 Id. at 1009. 
107 Id. at 1012. 
108 Id. at 1022. 
109 Christine Minhee & Steve Calandrillo, The Cure for America’s Opioid Crisis? End the 
War on Drugs, 42 HARV. JUR. L. PP. 547, 497 (2019). The authors argue that the disparity 
between how Americans view cocaine and heroin addiction as opposed to morphine, 
OxyContin or other prescription drug addiction creates a bifurcated view of addiction. By 
criminalizing the former and treating the latter, the policy response in effect is to deprioritize 
rehabilitation for those addicted to the “criminal” drugs.  
110 Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Choice and Criminal Law (2017). Faculty Scholarship, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2609&context=faculty_schola
rship. Actus reus is the legally wrongful act that must be proved that the defendant committed 
either voluntarily or intentionally. Mens rea refers to the mindset or degree of mental 
culpability which a defendant must have. These include knowing, negligent, intentional, 
deliberate. A defendant must have both an actus reus and mens rea, along with any other 
relevant elements of a crime in order to be found guilty. 
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drug intoxication is available for criminal defendants, this defense 
cannot be claimed for a mere drug possession charge.111 
Yet, the link between drug use and crime is no secret.  Drug 
users have consistently been found to participate in risky behavior 
overall.112  The word “addiction” is derived from a Latin term meaning 
“enslaved by” or “bound to.”113  This makes sense, because addiction 
fundamentally changes the reward system in the brain, making addicts 
literally slaves to their addiction.114  The individual no longer responds 
to the threat of punishment in the same way as a sober individual.115  
This explains why the threat of a judicial sentence has not and will not 
stop drug users from taking drugs and selling drugs to fuel their 
addiction.116 
The United States Congress determines criminal sentencing 
recommendations using four rationales for guidance: deterrence, 
retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.117  Prior to 1983, the 
Court compared punishment and defendant culpability to determine if 
a sentence “fit” the given crime.118  The United States followed this 
technique as precedent up until 1991, when the majority in the 
Harmelin Court claimed they got it wrong in Solem, stating that the 
Eighth Amendment is a “check on the ability of the Legislature to 
authorize particular modes of punishment…rather than a guarantee 
against disproportionate sentences.”119  In the concurrence, Justice 
Kennedy argued that legislatures should be free to choose from any of 
the four major rationales listed above in determining proper 
punishment for a given crime and that the weight given to each 
principle varies with time.120 
 
111 State v. Garcia, 784 P.2d 297, 300 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). 
112 Y. Saadatmand, M. Toma, & J. Choquette (2012). The War on Drugs and Crime 
Rates. Journal of Business & Economics, 10(5), 285-90. 
113 How Addiction Hijacks the Brain, HARVARD HEALTH PUBLISHING (July 2011), 
https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/how-addiction-hijacks-the-brain. 
114 Priya Shetty, Law and Order: Blame it on the Brain, BBC FUTURE (July 11, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120710-blame-it-on-the-brain. 
115 Id.  
116 Id. Nora Volkow, the director of the Institute on Drug Abuse at the National Institutes 
of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, draws this conclusion. 
117 John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
653, 717-20 (2012). 
118 Supra note 43. 
119 Supra note 96 at 960. 
120 Id. at 999. 
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Perhaps these four penological goals vary depending on the 
current views that America’s general population takes.  In 2018, a 
survey of over one thousand people showed that although 53% viewed 
prescription drug dependency as a medical issue, fewer than 20% of 
those surveyed would be “willing to associate closely with someone 
who is addicted to prescription drugs as a friend, colleague or 
neighbor.”121  The stigma behind addiction still thrives within our 
borders.  As more research on narcotics’ effects on the brain comes to 
light, the understanding of the country should grow and these instilled 
cultural beliefs will change. 
Just twenty years ago, our country and courts believed the 
execution of the mentally retarded met constitutional standards.  In 
1989, when first confronted with the issue of whether execution of the 
mentally retarded is constitutional, the Supreme Court found 
“insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing 
mentally retarded people.”122  During this time, only two states and the 
Federal Government prohibited execution of the mentally retarded, 
albeit allowing executions in general.123  
However, by 2002, the Court’s mindset shifted in Atkins v. 
Virginia.124  The Court found that “much ha[d] changed” in thirteen 
years in that the practice had become “truly unusual.”125  The reason 
behind this change of heart became evident when the decision stated 
that it was “fair to say that a national consensus had developed against 
it [execution of the mentally retarded].”  By this time, sixteen 
additional states prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded, and 
no states had reinstated the power.  The Atkins Court highlighted how 
the backbone of the decision rested on “not so much the number” of 
states that had acted, but instead “the consistency of the direction of 
change.”126  Further, the Court explained that executing mentally 
retarded individuals would not serve the interests of deterrence or 
 
121 Beth Leipholtz, Poll: Most Americans View Addiction As Disease, But Stigmatizing 
Views Persist, THE FIX, (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.thefix.com/poll-most-americans-view-
addiction-disease-stigmatizing-views-persist. 
122 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989). 
123 Cruel and Unusual Punishments, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION 
INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-8/cruel-and-unusual-
punishments. 
124 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
125 Id. at 316. 
126 Id. at 315.  Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014). This case would solidify the ideas set 
forth in Atkins. 
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retribution due to the lack of developmental capacities necessary to 
establish a threshold level of culpability.127 
Over time, our nation has come to accept the concept of 
lessened culpability of the mentally ill.  After that, our nation came to 
accept that adolescences too lack cognitive decision-making skills.  It 
is only a matter of time before this nation shifts to understanding 
addicted individuals’ lessened culpability.  Although it may seem 
radical now, as we collectively understand an addiction’s role on the 
brain and cognitive decision making, it is likely that the justice system 
will find more leniency and acceptance in pushing for rehabilitative 
measures as opposed to choosing LWOP for nonviolent addicts. 
C. REFUTING ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT 
LWOP FOR ADDICTS 
Proponents of the War on Drugs and its aftermath believe 
incarceration is the answer to America’s drug problem.  Some common 
arguments made by these believers include: 1) the cost of rehabilitation 
is greater than incarceration, and 2) prison inmates are impossible to 
cure with treatment, making rehabilitation a waste of resources.128  
Similarly, one could argue that allowing rehabilitation for criminals 
could create a slippery slope that would allow more and more criminals 
to claim to have a “drug problem” in order to evade the criminal justice 
system.   
Across America, prison costs continue to rise alongside the 
ever-growing prison population.129  According to the Federal Register, 
the national average cost to confine one prison inmate is $34,704.12 
per year.130  For elderly prisoners, that price tag climbs to anywhere 
 
127 Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a 
Categorical Exemption for  Juveniles From Capital Punishment, 33 N. M. L. REV. 207, 207 
(2003). 
128 Alan I. Leshner, TREATMENT OPTION FOR DRUG OFFENDERS IS CONSISTENT 
WITH RESEACH FINDINGS, 72 SEP N.Y. St. B.J. 53, 54 (2000). 
129 U.S. v. Leitch, 2013 WL 753445 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) “Everywhere you look 
federal policy makers are complaining about the rising costs of incarceration….Despite a 
sustained increase in federal prison spending, the continued growth of the prison population 
has resulted in overcrowding.” 
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from sixty to seventy-thousand dollars per year.131  While it would be 
incorrect to say all drug treatment programs are less expensive and 
naïve to claim any two rehabilitative services are built the same, there 
are undoubtedly cheaper available options.  Over 3,000 drug courts 
already exist across the country, their goal being to route addicted 
criminals to appropriate treatment rather than incarceration.132  
Nationally, the average drug court program cost ranges between $900 
to $2,200 per defendant.133  This is a small price to pay in order to 
allocate more effectively valuable criminal justice resources.134 
One may further argue that prisons already offer enough 
services for addicted prisoners.  In fact, The New York Times revealed 
in 2017 that fewer than 30 prisons across the country offer medications 
that combat opioid addiction—methadone or buprenorphine.135  The 
reality is that the services available are scarce and insufficient to 
provide necessary change.  Ultimately, the cost of one successful drug 
treatment is far less than cycling an addict in and out of prison for life. 
As for treatability, many citizens wrongfully believe that prison 
inmates are poor candidates for treatment.136  This mistaken belief 
stems from the longstanding view that addicts, especially those behind 
bars, are weak or powerless to better themselves.137  However, 
according to the director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 
scientific research shows that when the legal system pressures an 
individual to pursue treatment as an alternative to incarceration, the 
likelihood of success in drug treatment actually improves.138  This 
body of research, spanning twenty years in length, shows consistently 
high returns for society when drug treatment is used for addicted 
 
131 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT 
OFFENSES 194 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013). Inmates over 
age 50 tend to require increased healthcare and staff personnel, which in turn demands 
increased costs for the prison. 
132 Drug Courts, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2018), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238527.pdf. See also Lisa N. Sacco, Federal Support for 
Drug Courts: In Brief, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44467.pdf. 
133 Benefits of Drug Court, SANMATEO COURT, (2019), 
https://www.sanmateocourt.org/court_divisions/criminal/drug_court/benefits.php. 
134 Id. 
135 Matt Gonzales, Prisoners and Addiction, DRUGREHAB.COM (2019), 
https://www.drugrehab.com/addiction/prisoners/. 
136 Leshner, Alan I, TREATMENT OPTION FOR DRUG OFFENDERS IS CONSISTENT 
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criminals.139  Further, these individuals are proven to use fifty to 
seventy percent fewer drugs than those who go untreated, and fifty to 
sixty percent less likely to be incarcerated again.140 
The solution to the slippery slope concern requires drawing a 
line at nonviolent offenses that are direct consequences of addiction.  
Drug possession, minor drug sales, or stealing to promote a habit (if 
clear evidence of addiction exists) would all fit under this category.  
Criminals with violent offenses on their record within the last five 
years should not be able to claim they have a drug problem absent some 
other extenuating circumstances.  A defendant would have to be 
evaluated on a case by case basis by a professional in the field to 
determine eligibility for rehabilitation.   
Ultimately, the four policy rationales are not served by 
imprisoning nonviolent addicts for life.  Retribution for a nonviolent 
addict does not demand a LWOP sentence.141  Deterrence becomes 
marginal, and most importantly, the possibility of rehabilitation 
becomes unattainable.142 
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
“If lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for 
nonviolent drug addicts actually worked, one might be 
able to rationalize them. But there is no evidence that 
they do. I have seen how they leave hundreds of 
thousands of young children parentless and thousands 
of aging, infirm, and dying parents childless. They 
destroy families and mightily fuel the cycle of poverty 





141 Berry, supra note 80 at 1143. 
142 Id. 
143 Judge Mark W. Bennett, How Mandatory Minimums Forced Me to Send More Than 
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A. NEW SYSTEM OF REVIEW FOR LWOP CASES 
 The Supreme Court has historically relied on Congress and the 
states in deciding how to handle LWOP cases.  In order to eliminate 
any possibility of non-violent, addict offenders serving life sentences, 
either the Supreme Court or Congress must act.  The Court must hear 
a case on this narrow issue in order to proclaim a proper system of 
review—a process that could take decades.  Thus, Congress and our 
state legislatures should establish a new system of review for LWOP 
cases to ensure the speediest result. 
Compared to the rest of the world, America’s progress is 
lagging in the area of forward-thinking justice.  Nearly one-hundred 
other countries signed onto the Rome Statute wherein Article 110(3) 
requires all life sentences to be reviewed after twenty-five years.144  
Various European countries have abolished LWOP altogether while 
some countries do not even include the term “life imprisonment” 
within statutory language.145  On an international level, courts consider 
the release of LWOP prisoners in several European, African, Central 
Asian and South American countries.146  Upon release, these countries' 
standards focus on assisting prisoners to re-enter communities.147  
However, common conditions include regularized supervision, also 
known as a conditional release.148  These conditions may include 
regular supervision attendance, approved residence, home visits by a 
supervising officer, approved employment, travel restrictions, drug 
testing, and travel and behavior restrictions.149  Sixty-eight of the 
seventy-nine countries that allow for release of life-sentenced 
prisoners also contend that violation of a conditional release will result 
in “recall to prison.”150  This means exactly what it sounds like: an 
individual recently released from LWOP may be returned to prison for 
 
144 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT 
OFFENSES 200 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013). See Professor 
Dirk Van Zyl Smith & Dr. Catherine Appleton, A Life Imprisonment, A Policy Briefing, PENAL 
REFORM INTERNATIONAL (2018)  https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/PRI_Life-Imprisonment-Briefing.pdf. 
145 Id. 
146 Smith, supra note 144.  It is worth noting that the methods of release vary within each 
country. Determinants of a prisoner’s release vary from: a court, parole board, executive 
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committing an offense or violating parole conditions.151  Studies reveal 
that recidivism and re-arrest rates among released life-sentenced 
prisoners are low compared to other released prisoners.152  The key to 
successful reintegration into community life requires community 
programs and supervision in the community.153  
While America may not be actively participating in this 
international shift, some American states have recognized the need for 
change due to overcrowding within their state prison walls.154  
Oklahoma’s “Parole of Aging Prisoners Act” purports to ease prison 
overcrowding by creating a flexible geriatric release system.155  The 
state bill gives the parole board power to grant parole to a prisoner who 
is at least 50 years old and has served at least 10 years or one-third of 
his prison term.156  Eligible prisoners may request to appear before the 
parole board on the next available docket.157  However, because the 
bill excludes twenty-two crimes, including murder, arson, first-degree 
burglary, aggravated robbery, and any crime that would result in sex 
offender registration upon release, individuals serving life will not 
qualify.158  In fact, analysis of data from the Oklahoma Department of 
Corrections reveals that only one-quarter of the prisoners who are age 
fifty or above become eligible for parole under this law.159  Oklahoma 
 
151 Id. 
152 Brandon L Garrett, The Moral Problem of Life-Without Parole, TIME (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://time.com/4998858/death-penalty-life-without-parole/.  According to a 2013 California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation report, recidivism rates among LWOP prisoners 
who have been granted parole by the governor are extremely low, “markedly” less than those 
of other released prisoners. See also Christopher Zoukis, California Lifers Paroled in Record 
Numbers, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/mar/31/california-lifers-paroled-record-
numbers/. 
153 Life Imprisonment, A Policy Briefing, PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 2018), 
https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/PRI_Life-Imprisonment-
Briefing.pdf. 
154 Nicole D. Porter, Testimony to the NY Joint Leg. Budget Hearing on Public Protection, 
THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2019), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/testimony_given_by_the_sentencing_project.pd
f.  Of course, states have humanitarian concerns such as public safety and wellbeing. However, 
overcrowding has provided a neutral means of addressing the issue of mass incarceration for 
the states. 




159 ASHLEY NELLIS, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND LONG-TERM 
SENTENCES 6 (The Sentencing Project, 2017). 
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would be better served by amending this legislation to allow prisoners 
who are free of such violent offenses for five years to be eligible under 
the statute. 
A wiser alternative is to enact an “intermediate” proportionality 
standard of review for LWOP cases.160  This proposition would fall 
somewhere between the evolving standards of decency used in capital 
cases and the narrow proportionality principle used in non-capital 
cases.161  The heightened standard would ensure greater safeguards 
against error by forcing excessive review on a case by case basis.  In 
order to show an LWOP sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, the 
defendant must demonstrate that the sentence was excessive in 
duration as compared to the offenses.162  Also included in this method 
of review would be a mandatory LWOP case review every twenty-five 
years.   
Although the majority in Graham applied the evolving 
standards of decency to LWOP sentences, the dissent in Graham 
stressed that such an application departs from the Court’s prior 
precedent.  Thus, the best solution is to apply a new, unique standard.  
LWOP falls between a death sentence and a standard prison term, a 
fact that has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court Justices.163  
Both death and LWOP share the characteristic of irrevocability, and 
for that reason, when it comes to nonviolent addicts in need of help, 
there must be a new process to review such cases.  Such a new process 
of review will ultimately lead to releases of individuals from life 
imprisonment sentences, at which point, it will be proper to analyze 
successful models of release from overseas.  Until then, there are steps 
to be taken within our own borders to halt the number of addicted men 




160 Berry, supra note 80 at 1141. 
161 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  The Supreme Court implied in Graham that LWOP is 
somewhere between death and a non-capital sentence, since freedom thereafter is essentially 
“irredeemable” and it simultaneously forecloses the possibility of ever reviewing that 
determination. 
162 Berry, supra note 80 at 1142. 
163 Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (noting that “life without parole is “the second most severe 
penalty permitted by law.” It is true that a death sentence is “unique in its severity and 
irrevocability”; yet life-without-parole sentences share some characteristics with death 
sentences that are shared by no other sentences.).  
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B. REFORM 3 STRIKES, PROSECUTOR 
EDUCATION, & MORE REHABILITATIVE 
OPTIONS 
Nearly half of the states follow some form of two, three, or four 
strikes approach.164  Since the enactment of California’s Three-Strike 
Law, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 
(“Proposition 36”) has been introduced in an effort to undo the wrongs 
of Three-Strikes.165  Yet, critics question the impartiality of California 
courts and prosecutors in administering Proposition 36.166  The law 
applies to any “qualifying conviction for nonviolent drug possession,” 
and is intended to place drug addicts into treatment without letting 
violent users go free.167  However, the law mandates five eligibility 
requirements that narrow the scope of the program.168  First, 
defendants may not have any violent history on their records.169  
Second, a defendant will be disqualified if he or she is convicted of an 
unrelated misdemeanor or a felony in the same proceeding.170  Third, 
any defendant in use or possession of a firearm while under the 
influence of drugs is ineligible.171  Fourth, any defendant who refuses 
drug treatment as a condition of probation is ineligible.172  Last, any 
defendant who is “unamenable” to available forms of treatment will 
not be eligible for the program.173  These criteria allows prosecutors to 
exclude nearly anyone from receiving a diversion program by 
emphasizing certain facts about a defendant.174 
Ultimately, prosecutors have the power to effect change.  
Prosecutorial discretion plays a huge role in what “justice” is and how 
that justice is administered.  Clear evidence of this can be seen in the 
Graham case; the assigned prosecutor could have opted to try Graham 
 
164 Vitiello, supra note 49 at 463. 
165 Gregory A. Forest, Proposition 36 Eligibility: Are Courts and Prosecutors Following or 
Frustrating The Will of Voters?, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 628 (2005). 
166 Id. at 629.  
167 Id. at 628. 
168 Id. at 631. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. Unrelated meaning: not related to the present drug charge. 
171  Forest, supra note 165 at 632. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 632. 
174 Id. at 641. In one small county the District Attorney acknowledged that he could prevent 
every defendant charged with drug possession from qualifying for Proposition 36 by charging 
an additional misdemeanor offense. 
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as a minor and avoid three strikes altogether.  Further, in implementing 
Proposition 36 in California, prosecutor cooperation is essential for the 
law to work as intended.  The uneven application of Proposition 36 
requires its revision or some form of punishment for prosecutors who 
purposefully evade the law.  A fining system could be instituted so that 
prosecutors have greater incentives to act ethically.175  Continuing 
Legal Education programs can also be vital tools in instructing 
prosecutors about the realities behind an LWOP sentence and the 
proper use of discretion to guide defendants down the path of 
rehabilitation. 
Arguments that have been made in favor of Proposition 36 
include the following: (1) drug abuse is medically treatable; (2) 
incarcerating nonviolent drug offenders is wasteful; and (3) 
community safety is best served by diverting drug offenders out of 
incarceration and into treatment.176  The greatest obstacle holding this 
country back from reform is the general misunderstanding regarding 
addiction.  Until and unless drug addiction is widely understood as a 
disease of the brain, which alters problem-solving and rational 
thinking, our country will continue to criminalize this illness.   
V. CONCLUSION 
While addicts should not be excused because of their 
inculpable mental states, nor should we take pity on the outcomes of 
addicted individuals’ cases; our system must acknowledge that 
America has an addiction epidemic.  Further, we must collectively 
accept that our criminal justice system does nothing but fuel the fire of 
addiction instead of placing rehabilitation at the forefront.  To succeed, 
we must shift our focus to dampening the demand for drugs instead of 
stemming the supply.  In order to do this, three changes must be 
implemented at the federal level.  First, a new system of review for 
LWOP cases must be created.  Second, Three Strike Rules must be 
abolished, or at a minimum, reformed across the country.  Third, more 
rehabilitative options must become readily available and prosecutors 
must be reminded of their moral obligation to seek appropriate justice 
on a case by case basis.  If these changes are implemented, there is 
 
175 To date, no fining systems exist to ensure prosecutors uphold their moral and ethical 
responsibilities.  Disciplinary action against an individual attorney is the sole course of action.   
176 Forest, supra note 165, at 634. 
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hope for a United States where nonviolent addicts no longer serve life 
behind prison bars. 
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